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ADDRESS OF BRIG. GEN. STROM THURMOND, USAR, BEFORE THE CONNECTICUT
CAMG UNITS, ARMY TRAINING CENTER , NEw HAVEN, CONl~F: CTICUT ~ FRIDAY,
JANUARY 24, 1958, 8:00 P.M.
CAMG AND rl'HE PROBLEM OF SURVIVAL
COMMANDERS AND MEMBERS OF CAMG UNITS IN THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT AND
OTHER FRIENDS:
I am delighted to be in the great State of Connecticut on this
occasion.

I consider it most fortunate that this opportunity has

arisen for us to meet together.

This occasion makes it possible for

us to share our views on what is perhaps the chief problem of our
times.

Toward the solution of this problem, you have important tasks

to perform in the conduct of your Civil Affairs and Military
Government operations.
I believe it can be stated without exaggeration that the chief
intellectual problem confronting mankind, in this mid-decade of the
twentieth century, is the problem of survival.
In the solution of this problem of survival, the precise techni
cal knowledge of the physical sciences is essential, but also
necessary is the less precise knowledge of the social sciences, the
knQwledge of the ways of man in his individual and collective life,
the knowledge which study and experience will give you in the fields
of economics, government, administration, public relations and
services.
Above and beyond this mundane knowledge, you will require that
quality which only the Supreme Being can give you, but which you will
acquire only when your minds and hearts are open to its influx: wisdom.
In order to open my message to you, I would like your permission
to quote freely from the first chapter of the Second Book of
Chronicles:
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"Solomon the son of David established himself
in his kingdo m, and the Lord his God was with him
and made him exceedingly great ••o
9

"God appeared to Solomon, and said to him,
Ask what I shall give you. 9

And Solomon said to God,
and knowledge ••• v
11

9 •••

Give me wisdom

"God answered Solomon, 9 Because this was in
your heart, and you have not asked possessions,
wealth, honor, or the life of those who hate you,
and have not even asked long life, but have asked
wisdom and knowledge for yourself that you may rule
my people over whom I have made you king, wisdom
and knowledge are granted youoo• 9 "
(Second Chronicle 1:1-12 RSV)
As CAMG officers, you, too, like Solomon, have need of wisdom
and knowledge, in order that you may wisely and skillfully perform
your tasks in the government of people over whom your commander may
be placed by appropriate authority.
Thus, it has ever been in all the ages since Solomon's time, Man
has been seeking and gaining wisdom and knowledge.

Modern science is

a collation of that accumulated wisdom and knowledge.

To paraphrase

Will Durant in his introduction to The Story of Philosophy, science is
useful for two purposes~

To Heal and To Harm.

To Heal -- Science has overcome poverty, disease, and distress,
to give us a standard of living, in terms of quality and abundance,
and a length of healthful living, greater than all who came before us.
Corollary to this, we have developed codes of conduct, of personal
liberty, of protection of the individual from the mass.

I could with

enthusiasm devote my entire time to unfolding the magnificent scope
of this purpose of science.

However, permit me to pass on now to the

other purpose of science.
-
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To Harm - Science has conceived diabolical means for the waging
of war.

So vast have been the accomplishments in this regard that

they seem to overshadow the saner gains I previously mentioned.

I do

not feel that I need to specify more than this, because you, by virtue
of your membership in a Civil Affairs and Military Government organi
zation, are fully aware that survival has become the overriding
problem of our age and of our civilization.
Dr. James R. Killian, President of the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, whom President Eisenhower recently selected as Special
Assistant in the area of Science and Technology, stated in an address
in 1955:
"Survival as an intellectual problem, however, involves
a great deal more than military strength. It involves the
maintenance of a society strong in its economy, its will,
its confidence, and its moral purpose • .It requires a pre
occupation with those matters of the mind and spirit which
give a society coherence and its people courage and stamina.
It involves freedom of thought along with freedom for each
man to realize his fullest potential. Survival involves the
cultivation of a core of human excellence and integrity that
can stand unafraid and unbowed before the prospect of horror
and catastrophe."
This statement of Dr. Killian may be readily adopted and
incorporated as part of a code of CAMG conduct.

Bear in mind ever

that in your conduct of CAMG operations, the reconstruction and
"maintenance of a society strong in its economy, its will, its confi
dence, and its moral purpose" and the "preoccupation with those
matters of mind and spirit" are among the primary tasks given to you.
As CAMG officers, your business is conducted in a milieu of
social disorganization, in the midst of the human and material
destruction which warfare brings.

In the service of humanity, your

contribution to survival "involves the cultivation of a core of human
excellence and integrity that can stand unafraid and unbowed before
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the prospect of horror and catastropheo"
In a more mundane sense, as CAMG pers onnel, you are con cerned with
the problems of survival, first in terms of winning the war, then in
terms of winning the peace that must inevitably follow.
In employing techniques for controlling the people, economy and
governmental agencies, in areas where military forces of the United
States engage in active combat operations, and in employing methods
for handling problems of military-civil relationships, both in peace
time and in wartime, you have a complex mission in which is involved
the survival of humanity.
Let us not forget that your first objective is to promote combat-· 
to further military operations.

This is accomplished by exploiting

the civil potential and by preventing civilian interference with the
military effort ..
In a larger sense, the CAMG organization constitutes an instru
ment for implementing the foreign policy of our country and for
assuring that the conditions of international law and agreements are
observedo
While you must remember that it is with these matters you are
primarily concerned, both in peacetime and in wartime, you have
another task which is at the very core of the problem of survival that
I have mentioned.
You have the task of reestablishing public order and safety out
of the social chaos and disorganization which warfare engenders, of
preparing occupied areas for a reconstituted, economically stable,
representative form of government, and for the transfer of the area
to acceptable civilian control.
This latter task arises out of the very nature of warfare.
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To

achieve combat success, the military commander must destroy the enemy
and this includes the combat elements, the resources mobilized in
their support, and the political agency which directs the effort
against him.

Consequently, it is axiomatic to say that destruction

is essential to winning a war.
Karl von Clauswitz, in his 19th century work ON WAR, has stated,
"War is an act of force and to the application of that force there is
no limit.Ii

However, after the experiences during World War II with

V-2 bombs in England, buzz bombs in Belgium, "block-busters" in
Germany, and atomic bombs in Japan, reason dictates that force must
be applied with discrimination ~ Destruction must be measured and it
must be limited to the actual requirements of the hour.

Hence,

contrary to the views of those who advance massive strategic retalia
tion proposals of mutual annihilation, the force applied need not
necessarily be massive, neither need the destruction be total~
We may recognize that conflict between nations has many aspects,
planes or dimensionso

First, and foremost is the plane of the spirit,

sometimes suggested by the expression, "The battle for men's minds,n
and in which we may, in a most liberal sense, include Cold War
techniques, diplomacy, international cooperation, technological com
petition, economic and psycholo gical warfare, and similar engagements
in peace and war time, though in peacetime the effort is often regarded
as "short of war."

Be that as it may, in war time there are three

primary planes which may be identified as overland, overseas, and, if
I may be permitted to coin a term, "overair."
Throughout the ages, overland has been the traditional plane of
warfare.
existence.

To destroy an enemy, he must be engaged in his own plane of
He may be weakened elsewhere by consumption, but he can
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only be defeated when his plane of existence has been entered.
Consider the overseas techniques of the Norsemen.

Their

belligerent excursions out of Scandinavia found them in places where
ever water could carry them.

The Vikings sailed westward to Britain

and the other islands of the North Atlantic, even to Iceland, Green
land, and these shores of New England, not far from where we are now
assembled.

Southward, the Normans raided along the coasts of France

and the Iberian peninsula to the African kingdoms on the shores of
the Mediterranean, penetrating inland wherever rivers or streams
would accept their boats.

Eastward, the Swedish Varangians extended

their sway over the Baltic to Novgorod, and southward throughout
Kievan Russia, traversing the inland waterways of the Dvina, Dnieper,
and Volga Rivers that took them from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea
and on to Constantinople.
Overseas techniques have been considerably improved, of coursep
since the days of the Vikings.

Yet, as with the Vikings, the efforts

of their modern counterparts in overseas warfare were effective in
winning victory only when followed by overland operations.
Such a conclusion may also be reached with regard to overair
techniques.

In medieval times, the use of projectiles had considera

bly displaced the Roman emphasis upon the footsoldier~ though for a
time the horseborne soldier seemed to acquire some of the speed and
travel characteristics of projectiles, although not exactly their
overair features.

However, such techniques were soon neutralized by

development of fortified places, with wide and deep moats that neither
projectiles nor cavalry could invest.
Again, there was a recognition that only by overland techniques
could an enemy finally be defeated.
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Then, the overair projectile

became an adjunct to overland operations, as may be seen in a study
of the wars of the seventeenth century, the Thirty Years War c.nd the
wars of Louis XIV, and later the campaigns of Napoleon and the wars
of the nineteenth century.
The perspective of the present and its projection into the future
can not be clearly prophetic without illuminating it with the light of
recollection.

Military science, however much it may seem to be

distorted by marvelous developments in the physical sciences, is still
based upon a study of military history.
Modern overair techniques have been spectacular, whether we
consider the artillery and aircraft in both world wars or the develo p
ment of piloted jet propelled aircraft and guided missiles sincea
However, it is significant that throughout military history, the
effectiveness of overair techniques ha7e always been neutralized by
barriers or counteracting aggressive means.

Essentially, this is the

purpose of the construction of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line.
As in the case of overseas techniques, so in the case of overair
techniques, they must be followed by overland techniques if the war
is to be brought to a successful conclusion&

The example of

Hiroshima and Nagasaki may be regarded by some as prophetic of the
capability of modern overair techniques to bring wars to an end.

Be

that as it may, the novelty of the atomic weapon used, as well as the
psychological shock of horror that its use induced, had as much to do
with its effect as did its efficiency,

Today, however, after over a

dozen years of familiarity with atomic explosions, the novelty has
worn off.
Atomic weapons are becoming as much conventional in this late
twentieth century period as any other weapons.
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The aim of weapons

is to remove an enemy 9 s capability to resist or inflict harm.

This

may be accomplished by destruction, by inducing starvation, by
weakening the will or spirit, among many other ways.
The Communists have clearly shown that they regard a club as
sufficient in some cases as a hydrogen bomb or long range projectile
is in other cases.

The diversity of weapons, from the simplest to

the most complex, which the Communists have available for ready and
immediate use, discloses the pattern for future war which the
Communists anticipate.
Just last December, at the Convention of the Military Governmen~
Association in Boston, Mr. Roderick, Assistant Secretary of the Army r
stated:

"It would be tragic indeed if, in concentrating our efforts

in the field of long-range missiles and defenses against them, we
neglected what may well be the greatest threat of all.

This is the

threat of huge Communist ground armies having conventional means of
war."
One thing is certain.

Regardless of whether the arrival of CAMG

elements in an area may be by overland, overseas, or overair means,
CAMG operations are contingent upon the continuance of the use of
overland techniques.

CAMG operations are corollary to overland

operations where civil populations are involved.
said:

"No people, No CAMG."

It may almost be

Overseas and overair techniques are not

likely to involve people to be controlled or protected, unless followed
by overland operations.
It is also certain that from the moment the infantry first
penetrates enemy-held territory, the commander is an occupier under
the terms of international law.

Consequently, the application of

force, previously mentioned, even such controlled force as is required
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to wi n a war, has a tremendous effect upon the civil population •••
and the reaction of that population, in turn, can have a tremendous
eff e ct upon the command er 9 s ability to cont i nue the applica~~on of
the required force.
It can be seen, then, that the commander 9 s decisions are influ
enced not only by his own and the enemy 9 s relative combat power, but
also by the civil characteristics of the area of combat operations.
In his estimates of the situation, the commander carefully weighs
civil affairs and military government factors along with those dealing
with personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics.

The Depart

ment of the Army has clearly established this procedure in its
principal field manuals for commanders and their staff officers, and
has confirmed it by the establishment of a fifth general staff section
in the headquarters of Army organizations.
Furthermore, to the traditional two primary factors influencing
the tactical commander's decision as to his courses of action in
combat operations, there has been added a third factor.

In the past,

weather and terrain were the two factors affecting decision.

The

current edition of FM 100-5, Operations, which is the text of United
States Army concept of military science, states that there is a third
factor, civil conditions, namely, the political, economic, and
sociological characteristics of the area of operations, which FM 101-5,
Staff Procedures, sets out as the concern of the CAMG officer, the G5.
The Assistant Chief of Staff G5 is responsible to the commander
for all matters pertaining to the government, economy, civil population
and institutions in the area where United States Armed Forces are
employed.

It is his job to assure that CAMG planning is constant,

continuous, and in full coordination with all other planning in order
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that CAMG operations may best contribute to the overall mission of
the commander, first and foremost.

In addition, the G5 must assure

that CAMG planning accomplishes two other important objectives, among
others: .2.!lli, To ensure CAMG support of tactical and logistical
operations; and two, To resolve the civilian problems which handicap
or interfere with tactical and logistical operations.
There is a tendency upon the part of some people to believe that
the technological peculiarities of weapons developed since World War
II will induce radical changes in the aims of warfare.

However, I

conservatively submit to you that Clauswitz 9 summation of the overalJ.
objectives of warfare are equally valid for nuclear warfare.
These objectives of warfare are threefold:

~ , to conquer and

destroy the armed power of the enemy; two, to take possession of his
material and other source of strength; and three, to gain public
support.
which is~

These objectives are inherent in the mission of the Army,
"To defeat the enemy forces in land combat and gain control

of the land and its people."
It is evident that modern nuclear weapons and highly technical
military forces will require mobilization of the full industrial and
resource potential of a nation involved in war.

It is evident, also,

that the threat alone of the use of nuclear devices affects not only
whole nations but international balances as well.

Consequently, under

such conditions, it is even more evident that the combat commander must
conduct his operations with full recognition of the effect upon the
population involved and their political, economic and governmental
structures, if ultimate victory is, in fact, to be achieved.
As we look ahead to the atomic age, we see in the combat
commander 9 s mission new elements introduced, deriving from the vast
numbers of human beings affected by the extent and the intensity of

his operations when nuclear weapons are used.
Meeting such conditions den,ands the development and use of the
most. efficient CAMG organization which can be devised, an organization
in which are inherent two of the characteristics implicit in organi
zation for nuclear warfare:

~ , balance and flexibility, which

recognizes the essentiality of the Army in gaining post war objectives
and places greater reliance on air transportability; and ~!ill,
continuing need for conventional forces, which means that while being
relentless in the search to insure maximum combat effectiveness, it
is necessary to be prepared to cope with aggression of any kind, at
any time, at any place.
In this respect, it is significant to note that current CAMG
doctrine is adaptable to the requirements of the atomic age battle
field.

It is not old; it has emerged since World War II, and is

derived from the lessons of military history.

Four basic character

istics of this CAMG doctrine are:
One, CAMG units are the flexible cellular type, which can be
tailor-made with CAMG functional specialists and CAMG officers
necessary to meet the requirements of the area in which deployed, of
any size battle unit, and of any type of transportation, including
airborne.
Two, CAMG units, specially trained for both overland and airborne
field operations under combat conditions, are assigned to divisions,
corps, and field armies to give CAMG support to the commands
Three, In a mobile or unsettled situation, decentralization of
command authority ("Operational Chain of Command") over all CAMG units,
supplementary to those CAMG units providing direct support of combat,
assures that the demands of dispersal can be met.
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Four, A necessary aid to battle units operating over extended
areas fer prolonged periods is t he primary function of CAMG opzrations.s
to insure maximum utilization of the resources of the area for the
support of the combat forces.
While we tend to give greater attention to CAMG operations in
foreign lands, we may be forgiven because that has been the historical
projection of our work.

However, we must not disregard the domestic

projection, as a foreign enemy might attempt to attack us here in
the United States&

In view of this, we must not exclude from our

consideration that CAMG combat support may be required in an area
where the local population is not foreign but American.
We are all aware that in time of disaster, the Army has always
provided a reservoir of strength, aid and comfort for American
communities.

In the event of enemy attack, it can be expected that

the Army, in addition to resisting the attack, may also be called upon
to assist in Civil Defense and in providing essential public servicesc
Against this contingency, it is of considerable urgency to
national defense for the Army to have, both on active duty and in
reserve status, a CAMG capability, alive and vital, to have trained
a~d immediately available CAMG personnel capable of providing the
skills and leadership ability that times of crisis would demand.
Survival, which I mentioned earlier, is very much involved; in
this case, national survival.

For this reason, it is of primary

importance not only to have available the CAMG organization, as such,
but also to have the technological and professional competence of CAMG
personnel brought to peak efficiency.
There must be a continuing research program, in order to develop
new techniques, procedures, testing criteria, and detection of new
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research areas.

The training of CAMG personnel must give emphasis

to such subjects as th e role of CAMG i n combat opera tions; clevelopment
of plans, orders and annexes: problem solving methods and techniquesp
cultural and environmental factors affectine the relationship between
our military and the local governments and peoples; and procedures
for allocating manpower and resources.
There must be a full realization on the part of all military
commanders of the CAMG capability, in assuring the accomplishment of
his missions.

In this connection, military personnel throughout the

services must be indoctrinated in CAMG capabilities, in order to
provide the balanced force needed.

The operational nature of CAMG

activities, the G3-G5 relationship, must be fully understood.

In

addition, CAMG plans, units and staff sections must be included in
all maneuvers and CPX 9 s, in order that organizational and doctrinal
developments may provide the combat commander of the future with
a tested capability to handle his CAMG responsibilities.
With the chaotic conditions envisioned in atomic age warfare,
the commander's ability to handle the multitudinous problems -
technological, ideological, logistical -- posed by civil conditions
and the population among whom he is operating, may well spell the
difference between his success or failure.
Whether the commander is operating in a domestic or a foreign
area, the paramount problem will be survival.

This will be true,

whether it is national survival or the sur 11ival of mankind.

-END-
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